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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH
Craig J. Reece,
No. 19600
Plaintiff and Appellant,
PETITION FOR
REHEARING

v.
Board of Regents of the State of Utah
and The University of Utah,
Defendants and Respondents,

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, Craig J.
Reece, Plaintiff and Appellant in this matter, hereby petitions
for rehearing in this matter.

The Court issued an Opinion on

July 29, 1987 that was received by the Appellant by mail on
July 31, 1987.

As explained more fully herein, the basis for

this Petition for Rehearing is as follows:
I.

The Court did not apply the law governing appeals
from summary judgment;

II.

The facts and inferences supporting the Courtfs
Opinion are contradicted by or absent from the
record;

III.

The Respondent's rent increase procedures deny due
process; and

IV.

Several issues raised on appeal remain unresolved.

Appellant brought this suit against the Respondents in 1983
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to challenge the procedures for increasing rent at married
student housing at the University of Utah

The Appellant also

j

claims that the manner in which rent was spent violated due
process and equal protection.

This Court's opinion found,
{

among other things, that the procedures employed by the
University to increase rent did not deny due process of law
under the federal and state constitutions.

As discussed more

fully herein, the Court's opinion misapplied the law relating
to summary judgment and misapplied the law and the facts
applicable to the constitutional claims raised by the
Appellant.
I
THE COURT DID NOT APPLY THE LAW GOVERNING
APPEALS PROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT

<

The appeal to this Court was from the entry of Summary
Judgment in favor of both Respondents.

The Board of Regents
i

filed a Motion to Dismiss, but that motion was based on
affidavits and other matters outside the pleadings that were
attached to the motion.

Therefore, the Board's Motion to
"i

Dismiss was supposed to be treated as a Motion for Summary
Judgment. Utah R. Civ. P.12(b); Strand v. Associated Students
of The University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977).

On
i

appeal from a summary judgment, the court reviews the pleadings
and the file in a light most favorable to the party against
whom summary judgment was entered.
i

If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, the doubt
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should be resolved in favor of the opposing
party. Thus, the court must evaluate all
the evidence and all reasonable inferences
fairly drawn from the evidence in a light
most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment.
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).

Summary

Judgment "should be granted only when it clearly appears that
there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against
could prevail."

Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984).

As discussed below, the Respondent's facts in this case
were nonexistent or disputed while the Appellant's facts
supported his claims.
discovery.
9-11.

The Appellant was not allowed to have

Appellant's Brief at 5; Appellant's Reply Brief at

Given this state of the record, the Court should have

reversed the trial court in order to allow further discovery or
trial.
The Court's standard of review fails to give effect to the
federal laws applicable to this case.

The suit was filed,

inter alia, under the federal Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and federal regulations for subsidized housing may
apply.

Record at 322.

By indulging all inferences in favor of

the Respondent and disallowing discovery, the Court applied
different standards than apply in other cases and impaired
Appellant's ability to pursue the federal claims.

This

procedure fails to give effect to the remedial purpose of the
federal laws and is inconsistent with federal laws.

See Perry

v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (civil rights plaintiff
must be allowed an opportunity to prove the claim) and Adickes
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v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (summary judgment
should be denied if defendant's proof fails to preclude all
theories of recovery).

II
THE FACTS SUPPORTING THE COURT'S OPINION ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
A number of key factual statements in the opinion are not
supported by the record.

The individual contested facts are

discussed separately below.
The Court claimed that the Appellant argued that the Board
of Regent's authority to set rent was delegated to the
University in May, 1980.

Slip op. at 2.

This argument was

raised and maintained by the Respondents and opposed by the
Appellant.

The Court found that the power to set rent was

delegated in the bond resolution, but none of the parties ever
argued that position.

If that were true, then there would have

been no need for the Respondents to argue that the May, 1980
policy effected a delegation of the power of ultimate
approval.

The bond resolution does nothing more than allow the

University to recommend rental rates to the Board of Regents.
"Following the procedures outlined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46-12 (1953), the Board properly delegated to the
University of Utah Institutional Council the power to approve
new construction up to $1,000,000."
omitted).

Slip op. at 4 (footnote

There was never any evidencarintroduced as to what
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procedures the Board of Regents employed at any time.
Appellant's Reply Brief at 3.

It is not possible to assume

that a statute was followed when there was never any evidence
introduced on that point.

In fact, none of the parties ever

raised a question as to whether the delegation of authority to
approve new construction complied with the Administrative
Procedures Act.

Rather, the Appellant consistently argued that

this authority cannot be delegated because it was contrary to
the statute.
Brief at 4.

Appellant's Brief at 29-31, Appellant's Reply
The Respondent's argument simply removes a section

of the statute that the Legislature obviously thought was
important.
"A procedure was in place whereby questions or problems
[concerning rent increases] could be directed to the student
housing representative." Slip op. at 3.

There is nothing in

the record about what this procedure was, so the Court cannot
conclude that it would satisfy due process.

It was simply a

statement of fact by the Respondents that was disputed by two
affidavits in the record.

Record at 317 and 353-55.

"Either the tenant or the student housing representative
could address the institutional Council, which must approve all
rent increases."

Slip op. at 3.

The alleged student housing

representative was never identified and his relationship to the
Appellant is unknown.

There is no evidence that the council

would accept discussion by the public.

In any event, nobody

could address the Institutional council concerning rent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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increases because the record does not show that the
Institutional Council ever notified anybody when it was
considering rent increases.
"Notice of the council meetings is publicly posted."
op. at 3.

Slip

Although technically correct, this statement is

misleading and irrelevant. The posted agendas for the
Institutional Council did not say anything about rent
increases.

There is no evidence that they did.

It was

deceptive for the Respondents to create the illusion that the
posted notices were accessible to the Appellant or contained
information about rent increases when that was not, in fact,
the case.
"The trial judge acknowledged the outstanding discovery
request and concluded that his Order would completely dispose
of Plaintiff's Complaint." Slip op. at 5.

This is an incorrect

recitation of the Respondent's version of what the judge
allegedly said.

The Respondents claimed that the judge

"acknowledged that his order would cut off the discovery."
Respondent's Brief at 25.
supported by the record.

Neither version is correct or
in response to the Respondent's

request for an extension of time to to answer the discovery
requests, the trial judge said that he was taking the matter
under advisement and would rule on the motions before the
response time for the discovery requests would expire.

The

judge said this would give the Respondents adequate opportunity
to answer the discovery requests or move for a continuance if
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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necessary.

The Appellant has scrupulously avoided testifying

about facts not in the record.

However, testimony by counsel

for Respondents leaves the Appellant no choice but to try to
correct the record.
lt

[N]o request for a continuance appears in the record."

Slip op. at 5.

The Motion for Continuance is found in the

Record at 314-17 and 325.

The Respondent's admitted at trial

that a Motion for Continuance pursuant to Rule 56 (f) had been
filed.

Record at 330-31.

These matters are in the Appellant's

Reply Brief at 10.N The existence of a Motion for Continuance
was not disputed in the Trial Court, only the merits of the
motion were under discussion.

In any event, Rule 56(f) does

not require a motion, it only requires affidavits such as those
provided by the Appellant.

See Strand v. Associated Students,

561 P.2d at 193-94 (it was error to disallow discovery where an
affidavit was filed four days prior to the hearing).
Ill
THE PROCEDURES USED TO INCREASE
RENT DENY DUE PROCESS
The Court's opinion noted three reasons for concluding that
the Respondents provided adequate due process when increasing
rent.

These reasons are based on unsubstantiated and

incomplete statements of fact that are legally insufficient to
provide due process.
First, the Court stated that there was a procedure by which
questions or problems concerning rent increases could be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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directed to a student housing representative.

Slip op. at 3.

There is nothing in the record showing who this representative
is, what their relationship with the Appellant was, whether the
representative had access to information on rent increases,
whether the representative knew that they were responsible for
implementing the constitutional rights of the tenants, nor
whether the representatives knew how to transmit concerns to
the appropriate University officials.

Without this factual

record, one can only conclude that the Court's opinion stands
for the proposition that the mere existence of student
organizations is sufficient to satisfy due process for any and
all deprivations of property perpetrated by the University,

in

other words, nothing more than a "Dear Abby" satisfies due
process.

There is an affidavit in the record from the

President of the Village Assembly, which is one of the student
organizations at the apartment complex.

He was never aware of

any opportunities to make his objections known to the
Institutional council and he could not obtain the public
records concerning rent increases.

Record at 353-55*

The possible existence of a student group is irrelevant.
Constitutional rights are personal rights that can be asserted
only by the person affected by the government action.

United

States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Cavaness v. Cox, 598
P.2d 349 (Utah 1979).

Due process requires that the affected

persons have direct access to the decisionmaker.

The mere fact

thaJ^sqmfbody else might know about unconstitutional conduct
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and have access to the decisionmaker is irrelevant.

Memphis

Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978).
The Court should consider the impact of its decision on the
personal liability of the alleged student representatives.
There is no evidence, and the Appellant specifically disavows,
that any students have been chosen as agents or representatives
of the Appellant with respect to rent increases.

Regardless

whether the imaginary student representatives are agents of the
Appellant or the State, such representatives could be
personally liable for failing to adequately fulfill their
responsibilities as custodians of legal rights.

The Appellant

does not favor this result but it is a logical and natural
consequence of the official status bestowed upon these alleged
representatives by the Courtfs opinion.

If they have an

obligation to represent someone, they can be personally liable
for failure to do so.

If they have no obligation, then the

existence of student representatives is irrelevant to this case.
Second, the Courtfs opinion stated that the notice for the
Institutional Council meeting was posted in a public place.
However, the notice did not indicate that rent increases would
be considered at the meeting for which the notice was issued.
Therefore, the Court's opinion must stand for the proposition
that a notice that says nothing about the deprivation of
property satisfies due process.

This holding is contrary to

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); and is also
inconsistent with every decision the United States Supreme
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court has issued on the subject.

Under the Utah Open Meeting

Statute, if the meeting agenda did not list an item for
discussion, it would have been improper for the institutional
Council to have received comments concerning rent increases.
Even if the Appellant had appeared at the meeting, it is
doubtful how much substantive discussion would have occurred.
In any event, the Court cannot conclude that a notice of a
meeting posted in a "public place" satisfies due process.

Due

process requires notice that is most likely to convey the
necessary information to the affected party.

A substitute for

personal service is allowed only if personal service would be
an unreasonable burden under the circumstances.

Mennonite

Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).

A posted

notice is constitutionally deficient if there is evidence to
indicate that the affected parties do not, in fact, have a
reasonable liklihood of being notified of the pending
government action.

Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).

It

is contrary to law to automatically conclude that posted notice
was sufficient when more direct and informative means of notice
were plainly available.

In fact, the Respondents did provide

personal notice of the effective date of rent increase, so it
would have been no additional burden to include information on
the time and place of the appropriate meetings.
Finally, the Court places reliance on the fact that notice
of the effective date of the rent increase was sent to the
Appellant.

The Court acknowledges that the notice did not
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mention the time and date of the Council meeting where the
increases would be considered.

Slip op. at 3.

The notice

provided by the Respondents was not only deficient, it was
deceptive and misleading.

The notice indicated that the

decision was final, so there would have been no need for the
Appellant to even attempt to appear at an institutional Council
meeting.

Appellant's Brief at 19-20.

It is not apparent how a

notice can be "fair" if it is deceptive and fails to convey the
necessary information.
IV.
SEVERAL IMPORTANT ISSUES WERE NOT
ADDRESSED IN THE COURT'S OPINION
The Court's opinion failed to address several important
constitutional issues that were raised in this case.

First, as

mentioned in the opening paragraph of the opinion, this suit
claims that the Respondent's practices deny equal protection of
the law.

The resolution of the equal protection argument is

not mentioned in the opinion.

Although the Appellant was not

allowed to have any discovery, he did identify several
expenditures that deny equal protection:

(1) using rent to

subsidize other facilities in the Student Housing Bond System;
(2) using rent to construct new buildings for the economic
benefit of the University and other tenants; (3) surplus
utility charges are taken by the University; (4) interest
earned from rent is taken by the University; (5) the Village is
used to subsidize University operations; and (6) surplus rent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is given to the University,

Appellant's Brief at 22.

These

expenditures deny equal protection by (1) discriminating
between students who live in the Village and students, faculty
and staff who do not live at the Village, and (2)
discriminating between students who live in the Village at
different times.

The basis of the argument is that these

expenditures provide minimal to nonexistent benefits to the
Appellant while others who do benefit are riot required to share
the financial burdens. Numerous factual and legal questions
exist concerning the extent of the discrimination between the
Appellant and the faculty, staff and other students at the
University.
Another unresolved issue is whether using rent to construct
and remodel buildings and subsidize the University violates
substantive due process.

Appellant's Brief at 21-31. In

connection with this argument, Appellant also points out that
the capital improvements for the Village were never approved by
the Institutional Council and are therefore unlawful.
Appellant's Brief at 30.

The approval required for capital

improvements was not addressed in the Court's opinion and the
Respondents did not dispute the substantive due process
allegations.
The Court's Opinion also did not discuss whether the
meetings of the institutional Council were the proper kind of
"hearing" required by due process.

This is because the meeting

does not involve discussion of any evidence. There is no
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effective means of disputing a rent increase when the
University is not required to justify what it is asking for and
prevents access to the necessary public documents.

Appellant's

Brief at 17-18.

CONCLUSION
The Court has a great opportunity to advance the rights of
the public when faced with arbitrary and unlawful state action
that deprives citizens of substantial sums of money.

During

the bicentennial celebration of the Constitution, it is only
fitting that the Court zealously fulfill its role as an
impartial guardian of the rights of private citizens. For the
reasons stated herein, the Petition for Rehearing should be
granted.
Appellant certifies that this Petition for Rehearing is
filed in good faith and not for purposes of delay.
Dated this IQ

day of August, 1987.

Craig J
Appellan
Copy of the foregoing mailed
this |^> day of August, 1987,
to:
David L. Wilkinson,
Douglas E. Richards and
William L. Walker
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah) 84114
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